Internet of things (IoTs) is the newfound information architecture based on the internet that develops interactions between objects and services in a secure and reliable environment. As the availability of many smart devices rises, secure and scalable mass storage systems for aggregate data is required in IoTs applications. In this paper, we propose a new method for storing aggregate data in IoTs by the use of ( , )-threshold secret sharing scheme in the cloud storage. In this method, original data is divided into blocks that each block is considered as a share. The edge server does not send these shares (blocks) directly (through the secure channel) to cloud service providers ( s). Rather, the edge server hides the shares (blocks) with XORing two secret values and publishes the result. Indeed, with this method, none of s has an amount of block information.This scheme is also verifiable, i.e., in the verification phase, each can verify its quasi-share. Moreover, before data retrieval, the edge server checks the correctness of provided quasi-share from s of an authorized group. Also, the proposed scheme is scalable, since new data can be inserted or part of the original data can be deleted, without changing shares. It is worth noting that the proposed scheme is more efficient compared with the other scheme since heavy and complex computation is not required.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of the internet of things was first introduced by Ashton [1] in 1999. He describes a world in which everything has its own digital identity and allows computers to manage them. The most important feature of IoTs is the ability to connect various types of objects to the virtual world.
The model of IoTs and its standards have been reviewed and surveyed in several literature studies [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Miraz et al. [5] discussed the the Internet of Things (IoTs), Internet of Everything (IoE), and Internet of Nano Things (IoNTs). They have distinguished the difference between IoTs and IoE which are wrongly considered to be the same by many people. Moreover, Lin et al. [4] , first explore the relationship between Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and IoTs. Then they present existing architectures, enabling technologies, and security and privacy issues in IoTs to enhance the understanding of the state of the art IoTs development. The challenges in IoTs have been addressed in several studies. Andra et al. [9] presented security vulnerabilities and challenges in IoTs and explored the security requirements for IoTs and provided a classification of the security challenges in IoTs systems using a new unique classification method consisting of four classes of attacks: physical, network, software, and encryption attacks. Moreover, Botta et al. [10] presented the integration of cloud computing and IoTs. In addition, Samuel [6] reviewed connectivity challenges in the IoTssmart home. Also Wei et al. [11] presented survey work on the challenges issues and opportunities in IoTs. Generally, the IoTs system requires confidentiality, integrity, authentication and access control. Privacy and access control are also the major challenges of IoTs [12] .
As the availability of many smart devices rises, fast and easy access to data as well as sharing more information is felt. Moreover, secure and scalable mass storage systems for aggregate data are required in IoTs applications [4] . Mollah et al. [13] proposed a new cryptographic scheme that smart devices can share data securely with others at the edge of cloud-assisted IoTs with checking the integrity of decrypted data in data sharing and downloading phase. Furthermore, they proposed data-searching scheme to search desired data/shared data by authorized users on storage where all data are in encrypted form.
One of the methods used in the IoTs is to employ the secret sharing scheme [14] . A secret sharing scheme is designed to safeguard a secret by splitting it into shares and distributing them among a group of participants. In 1979, ( , ) -threshold secret sharing schemes were proposed by Blackley [15] and Shamir [16] , independently. In a ( , ) -threshold secret sharing scheme, a secret can be shared among participants such that or more participants can reconstruct the secret, but − 1 or fewer participants can not share it.
To adapt the IoTs applications, a cloud service provider offers rapid access to flexible, low-cost resources. Cloud computing is the most cost-effective method for utilization, protection, and upgrading the program and data. The advantage of using cloud computing is the almost unlimited storage space. Therefore, there is no need to concern about possible space shortages and to increase storage space. Also, since the information is stored in the cloud, preparing a backup version and restoring the information is much easier than storing the same information on a physical device. Therefore, most cloud service providers compete for data retrieval.
Asadi and Hamidi [17] point to the privacy issues of big data distributed in the cloud computing and analyze the privacy issue with the Petri model. Chen et al. [18] and Shen et al. [19] used the revised Blakley's and Shamir's secret sharing schemes, respectively, in a secure distributed file system. Then, Jiang et al. [14] proposed a secure and scalable storage system for aggregate data in IoTs, using the method proposed by Shen et al. [19] . Jiang et al. [14] introduced big data with bytes which was divided into blocks with − 1 bytes for storage. Then, for each block, a polynomial of degree − 1 is generated, and each byte of each block is considered as a coefficient of a polynomial. Moreover, in this scheme, new data can be inserted, or part of the original data can be deleted, without changing shares.
In this paper, we proposed a new scheme based on the method Jiang et al. [14] for storing aggregate data in IoTs in cloud storage. In this scheme, we use a ( , ) -threshold secret sharing scheme. Our proposed scheme has the following properties: 1. The edge server divides the data into blocks, and each block is considered as a share. However, the edge server does not send these shares (blocks) directly (through the secure channel) to s, but the shares are generated by published information.
2. The correctness of published information about s can be verified by s in the verification phase. 3. In the data retrieval phase, before the data retrieval, the correctness of provided information by s checked by the edge server. Thus, the edge server can prevent the cheating of some malicious s. 4. The edge server is responsible for receiving, sharing and retrieving data. However, if the security of the edge server is compromised, then s can retrieve the data in collaboration with each other and with the information, they had. 5. The new data can be inserted or part of original data can be deleted, without changing shares. 6. We have only simple and easy calculations of the hash function, and we only use "⨁" (bitwise exclusive OR) and "||" (concatenation) operators in the calculations. These operators make our scheme less costly and more efficient than other schemes [13, 14] . The rest of the paper is structured in the following sections: in section 2 we provide some definitions. In section 3, we propose the new method for storing aggregate data of IoTs applications in cloud storage. Section 4 involves analyzing the proposed method. In this section, we will describe some of the features and performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, section 5 concludes our paper.
PRELIMINARIES

1. Overall System Architecture
Data owner The data owner is the possessor of the sensitive data that he/she wants to store his/her data in the cloud storage environment. He/she registers in the cloud account and uploads his/her data by PC or laptop or smart devices. Then, whenever necessary, he/she will be able to access the data by requesting the data in his/her cloud account.
Edge server This part of the cloud receives data from the data owner and, for storing it, divides the data into shares by the secret sharing scheme. We do not have absolute trust in this party, which means that the edge server may be misled in generating and publishing values.
Cloud Service Provider ( ) This party receives a share from the edge server. The s of an authorized subset send their shares to the edge server for retrieving the data. We do not have trust in this party, which means that this party maybe sends an invalid share to the edge server in the data retrieval phase.
Bulletin Board (BB) One of
is considered as a bulletin board, which public values published in it. We suppose that only the edge server can publish the values on the bulletin board, and only it can change the values on the bulletin board, and the other ( s) can only view the published values.
Security Properties
Correctness If edge server and s act honestly, the data retrieve by shares of any authorized subset of s. Verifiability Each must be able to check the accuracy of its share. Furthermore, before retrieving data, the edge server must be able to verify the accuracy of the shares received by the s in order to prevent the cheating of s. Secrecy The basic requirement is that an adversary cannot learn any information about the data, or it is impossible for any collusion of less than s to obtain any information about the data.
3. Cryptographic Method
We say that hash function is cryptographically secure if satisfies the following conditions: • The hash function should be preimage resistant, i.e., for a given output of , it should be difficult to find a message such that = ( ). • The hash function should be second preimage resistant, i.e., for a given , it should be difficult to find a message ≠ such that ( ) = ( ). • The hash function should be collision resistant, i.e., it should be difficult to find two different messages and such that ( ) = ( ). The difficulty of finding a collision depends on the size of the hash value.
4. Threat Model
Insider threats Malicious insiders such as s that want to access/disclose/modify the stored data.
Outsider threats Outside intruders are those who want to access the data, alone or with the collaboration of some unauthorized subsets of s.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed scheme. We need some notations and values in Table 1 .
In the proposed scheme, we assume that each has , which receives them with 2 ′ ! "# = ( 2 ) from CA (certificate authority). Also, CA sends to the edge server. The steps of the proposed scheme are as follows:
• Submitting the data -Registration As shown in Figure 1 , the data owner selects a username and registers her/his information. Then, he/she receives a password (note that the data owner can change the password). The hash value of (Block ||4) ,
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The hash value of quasi-share 5 Figure 1 . Registration and submission of data by the data owner -Login and submitting 1. The data owner logs into a nearby edge server from a smart device using the username and password and submits the data .
2. The data owner also submits some related keywords of the data such that any authorized recipient users are allowed to view to find the data. In this case, the data owner can introduce some users to access data. There are two cases when users of the group want to access the data using keywords: -Users of the group are authorized to access the data.
In this case, authorized users request the data by providing keywords. Then, the edge server provides the data to them. -The data owner revokes access of some users to the data in the group. In this case, the data owner revokes access of some users (= ) by providing ( , keywords, $>?) to the edge server (note that we assume $>? is a sign of revocation of access to the data). Once, when the user = requests the data by providing the keyword, the edge server checks the user = access to the data. In this case, the edge server will display "unauthorized access" to the user = .
• Construction 1. After submitting the data by the data owner, the edge server first publishes an access structure @ = {A , A , … , A B } on the BB, where A 3 (4 = 1, 2, … , .) is an authorized group. Then, the edge server splits the data into blocks with size . If ∤ |Data| , then the edge server appends the randomly generated padding strings to the end of the data such that | |Data || padding|. 
Suppose
4. Now, the edge server acts based on the following cases: -If |Block [| \ ] 1. The edge server appends the randomly generated padding strings to the end of each block such that the length of the block equals to +. , =⊕ efg h ∈# i 5 ⨁ 5 6 3 (4)
= ( || || ), ∈ j {0, 1} * (8)
where = 1, 2, … , , 4 = 1, 2, … , .. 3. The edge server sends 5 ; to and publishes , 5 6 3 , 5 ′ , 7 4 , : 4 , and Hash function on the BB ( , 5 6 3 , 5 ′ for and 7 3 , : 3 for itself). Indeed, each just gets 5 as quasi-share and in the Verification phase, it just needs to verify the validity of 5 . Then, the edge server stores the size of paddings. Figure 2 shows the construction phase of the proposed scheme.
-If |Block [|= ] or |Block [|= k] 1. In case |Block |= +, it is not necessary to perform the padding for Block in Eq. (2). 2. In case |Block |= W+, the edge server considers W-2 3 = -2 3 ||-2 3 ||. . . ||-2 3 OPPPPQPPPPR l .
Similar to Equation (11), the edge server considers W , , W 3 instead of , , 3 . Then, the edge server performs the rest of the calculation in the same way as the case |Block |\ +. Note that the size of the block here is greater than + and is not divisible by +. In this case, the edge server performs as follows:
Then, the edge server performs the rest of the calculation in the same way as case |Block |= W+. and then checks
If Equality (13) holds, the published hash value 5 < is valid. Otherwise 5 < is invalid. After successful verification, the edge server deletes , = 1, 2, … , .
• Data requesting and retrieval
We only show data retrieval for the first case where |Block |\ +, and the two remaining cases are similarly obtained. 1. If data owner requests the data (or an authorized user requests the data by searching keywords), then s of an authorized group 4 provide their quasi-shares to edge server. 2. After sending quasi-shares 5 by ( = 1, 2, … , ), the edge server obtains and checks 5 << = (5 ) (14)
The edge server accepts quasi-share 5 , if Equality (15) holds, and rejects it otherwise. 
Then, the edge server appends the obtained blocks together for retrieval. Figure 3 shows the Data retrieval phase of the proposed scheme. then the edge server randomly appends a new padding in the same way as the first instance of the previous case.
Inserting new data between Block [ and Block [ o p
The new discrete block(s) is/are generated similar to case 1.
Inserting new data after the last Block
• Deleting part of the data Suppose that part of data is deleted. So, there will be three cases. Then, edge server appends padding to the newly generated blocks. Now, if the number of deleted Blocks m |Block |, then the edge server selects several adjacent blocks of deleted data for splitting and generates new blocks instead of deleted blocks similar before.
ANALYSIS OF OUR PROPOSAL
1. Security Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the features of our proposal. Theorem 4.1. Any collusion of less than s cannot obtain any information about the data.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose , , …, 9r (malicious insiders) with quasi-shares 5 , 5 , …, 5 9r , respectively, intend to retrieve the data without 9 . To do this, malicious insiders should obtain blocks -, -, …, -9 . However, to obtain these blocks, they need values -2 3 , 3 , which values -2 3 , 3 are derived from Equations (5) and (6), respectively. That is, they must first obtain the quasi-share 5 9 . Malicious insiders can try to derive quasi-share of 9 by published value 5 < in the construction phase. Since the hash function is one-way, they cannot obtain the quasi-share 5 9 from public information 5 < .
Theorem 4.2. The edge server cannot cheat by publishing invalid values in the Construction phase. Indeed, its cheating is detectable.
Proof According to the verification phase, if the edge server publishes invalid 5 < , then Equality (13) does not hold. Indeed, since the hash function is second preimage resistant, the edge server cannot find the second preimage 5 ̅ such that 5 < = t5 ̅ u = (5 ) . Moreover, since values 7 3 , : 3 are required for data retrieval, so the edge server must publish valid values of 7 3 , : 3 in the construction phase. Otherwise, in the data retrieval phase, the original data will not be restored, and this will be the edge server error. ∎ Proof Suppose outside intruders want to achieve blocks of data by public information , 5 6 3 , 5 ′ , 7 4 , : 4 . But, according to proof of Theorem 4.1, outside intruders need to get a quasi-shares of s to get blocks and retrieve the original data. But since is a one-way function, they can not get quasi-shares and retrieve data using public values 5 < . ∎ Remark Our proposal is scalable because we can add new data or delete part of the original data without changing all the shares. When inserting new data, previous shares don't change and only some new shares are generated. Also, when part of the original data is deleted, only some of the blocks are affected by the deletion of the data that are subject to change.
2. Performance Analysis
In this section, in Tables 2 and 3 , we consider two schemes for comparison with our scheme. One of the reported schemes [13] is based on the cryptographic mechanisms and the other [14] is based on the secret sharing scheme.
The scheme introduced by Mollah [13] used RSA and AES cryptosystems. Since the computational complexity of the RSA encryption is 0( w ), the computational complexity of the scheme becomes 0( w ) (It is notable that the symmetric cryptosystem AES has a much lower computational complexity, so we ignore it).
The scheme introduced by Jiang et al. [14] splits the data into several blocks such that for each block, a polynomial of degree − 1 is formed. If we assume that there are T blocks, then we have T polynomials. To retrieve data, each shares together retrieves these T blocks and the scheme requires 0(T ) computations.
The proposed scheme is established based on the x01 operator, concatenation, and hash functions. The construction phase requires 0( ) computations since it consists of (5. o 9) o 3 x01 operators, concatenations and hash function calls. The verification phase comprises of ( ) x01 operators, (2 ) concatenations and calls the hash function ( ) times. Therefore, it is accomplished in 0( ). Similarly, the data retrieval phase comprises of (2 ) x01 operators, ( ) concatenations and calls the hash function ( ) times. Therefore it is accomplished in 0( ).
3. Experimental Evaluations
We implemented and compared the runtime of the proposed method and the technique introduced by Jiang et al. [14] . In both experiments, the same 10000 secret messages each of length 70 bytes are sent to participants ( s) and reconstructed using shares. Each experiment is repeated 10 times and the average required time per message is measured. Figure 4 shows the results of the methods for = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. The methods are implemented in C#.Net on a regular PC with an Intel G3220 3.0 GHz CPU and Windows 10 operating system. The results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method in all cases. This performance gain is the result of using hash functions and simple operators such as XOR and concatenation instead of heavy matrix or polynomial computations in finite fields. It is notable that the proposed method also includes the verification step that is not part of the technique defined by Jiang et al. [14] .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a new verifiable and scalable cloud storage for aggregate data in IoTs. In this scheme, the edge server divided the data into blocks and each block was considered as a share. But these blocks were hidden for each . Indeed, the edge server obtained a quasi-share for each and published the hash value of it. Then in the data retrieval phase, the edge server retrieved the blocks of data by quasi-share of s of an authorized group. In the verification phase, each obtained the hash value of its quasi-share and compared it with published hash value by the edge server to observe whether the valid hash value has been published to it by the edge server. Moreover, before data retrieval, the edge server checked the correctness of provided quasi-shares by s. Therefore, the fault of s in providing invalid quasi-shares was detectable. Since blocks of data are hidden using the quasi-shares, the confidentiality of data is maintained. Thus, this scheme is safe against attacks of malicious insiders and outsiders. Also, in our scheme, new data can be inserted or part of the original data can be deleted, without changing all shares. Furthermore, we showed that our scheme is more efficient than some other schemes because, in this scheme, we had only simple and easy calculations of the hash function, and we only used "⨁" (bitwise exclusive OR) and "||" (concatenation) operators in the calculations. [14] In this paper, we proposed a scheme in which the edge server is trusted. But in the real world, the server may not be absolutely reliable. In this way, it can exploit user information and documents. So, we are looking to propose a scheme in which the edge server and s are not reliable, and the user's file and information in cloud environments are stored in such a way that the servers and s do not access its content in any way.
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